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According to U.S. Census Bureau projections, the United States will
face dramatic demographic changes over the next one hundred years.
Indeed, the country will be entering largely uncharted territory. In the
twenty-ﬁrst century, the population is expected to grow more slowly than
ever before over an extended period. The population will also age rapidly,
with the share of the population over 65 climbing to a succession of new
record highs. Finally, the United States will once again become a nation of
immigrants. Over the past decade, the wave of new immigrants has already
neared proportions last seen in the early 1900s at the end of the Great
Migrations. And this inﬂow is projected to persist throughout the coming
century, with new immigrants and the children of those immigrants con-
tributing well over half of the increase in the U.S. population. Because the
source of this inﬂow has shifted from Europe to Latin America and Asia, this
new wave will change the voice and face of America forever.
These demographic shifts are likely to trigger some major adjustments
within the U.S. economy—many of which will play out in U.S. labor
markets. To many observers, one particularly challenging issue is how a
relatively small workforce will supply the consumption needs of a growing
number of dependents without a decline in U.S. living standards. Increased
productivity provides one obvious answer to this challenge. But human
capital has proved key to achieving productivity gains, and, on average,
recent immigrants have relatively little schooling compared with U.S.
natives. Thus, while the renewed inﬂows of migrant workers will enlarge the
supply of labor, their arrival may also reduce average levels of educational
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Matthew LaPenta for excellent research assistance.attainment and possibly slow U.S. productivity growth relative to what they
otherwise might be. Further, while some analysts anticipate capital deepen-
ing, others fear that investment capital will be in short supply.
While much previous work has examined the impact of population
aging and slow workforce growth or increased immigration on U.S. labor
markets (see Gruber and Wise 2001, Borjas 2000, or Smith and Edmonston
1997, for instance), this paper explores the implications of all three projected
demographic developments for U.S. labor markets. In so doing, it puts
particular emphasis on the outlook for aggregate U.S. welfare, labor quality,
and productivity growth. The next section describes the three major demo-
graphic trends in more detail, while the second section discusses the rise in
the ratio of the non-working-age population to the working-age population
that is likely to result from these interwoven developments. The third section
examines the economic adjustments that might be triggered by these
demographic trends, while the ﬁnal section explores some policy implica-
tions.
THE MAJOR DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
As outlined in the introduction, demographic projections reveal
three major trends affecting U.S. labor markets in coming decades: the
slowdown in U.S. population growth, population aging, and the in-
creased importance of immigrants and their descendants within the
population and labor force. This section also discusses likely changes in
the educational attainment of the labor force.
Slow Population Growth
According to the Census Bureau’s most recent middle series projec-
tion,
1 the annual rate of U.S. population growth will decline fairly
steadily from an average of about 1 percent in the 1990s to 0.7 percent in
2050. That rate would be lower than any experienced in the twentieth
century except during major wars, when a signiﬁcant share of the U.S.
resident population served on foreign battleﬁelds, and during the 1930s
when population growth rates ranged between 0.6 and 0.8 percent
(Figure 1). This projected decline reﬂects an assumed rise in crude death
rates as the population ages and a fall in crude birth rates as the share of
the population of childbearing age declines.
2 Since the working-age
1 Released in January 2000 (1990-based projections). The Census Bureau designates its
middle series projection as the most likely outcome. The high and low series are included
to illustrate the great degree of uncertainty surrounding the central projection (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2000). The projected U.S. population in 2100 ranges from 283 million in the low
series to 1,182 million in the high series compared with 571 million in the middle series.
2 The birth rate is expected to fall despite the fact that these projections assume a slight
increase in total fertility rates because of the increased importance of racial/ethnic groups with
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population (0.6 percent per year), its share in the total falls from 52
percent currently to 45 percent in 2100.
It is worth noting as a caveat, however, that early results from
Census 2000 indicate that the U.S. population actually grew faster than
the Census Bureau had expected between 1990 and 2000—with the total
population reaching 281 million, or 2 percent more than projected in
January 2000. The 13.2 percent gain between 1990 and 2000 was the
biggest since the 1960s, when the population rose 13.4 percent, and the
relatively high fertility rates within the population. However, in a break with past practice, the
most recently issued projections do assume convergence in fertility rates across racial/ethnic
groups. Immigrant women’s fertility is expected to converge to native rates within the same
racial/ethnic group, and fertility rates for all racial groups are assumed to converge very
gradually to the replacement level of just over 2 percent. Fertility rates for non-Hispanic white
women have been at this level since the late 1980s. (See Hollman, Mulder, and Kallan 2000, p.
3.)
THE IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE ON U.S. LABOR MARKETS 1331950s, when it soared by 18 percent. Accounting for almost half of the
unexpected gain was a surge in the Hispanic population, which grew by
almost 3 million more than projected.
3 Since a growing share of U.S.
immigrants come from Mexico and the Caribbean, an unexpectedly high
rate of immigration may explain a signiﬁcant part of the surprising
outcome.
Population Aging
The second major demographic trend—the rapid aging of the U.S.
population—reﬂects the decline and stabilization in U.S. fertility rates
since the birth of the baby boom generation,
4 and, more important, a
secular increase in life expectancy and the entry of the large baby boom
cohort into normal retirement age between 2011 and 2030. As a conse-
quence of these trends, the Census Bureau expects the share of the
population over 65 to rise, after this decade’s short pause, from 13 percent
now to 20 percent in 2050 and 23 percent by 2100. The proportion over
age 85 will triple, from less than 2 percent to 6.5 percent at the end of the
century.
The Increased Importance of Immigration
The third major development is the increased role of immigration in
U.S. population growth. As Figure 2 shows, the share of U.S. population
growth explained by the arrival of permanent legal immigrants has
grown from very low levels in the 1930s and 1940s to its highest level in
decades in the 1990s. Estimates based on Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) data suggest that over the past ten years immigrants may
have supplied roughly 35 percent of the growth in the U.S. population, a
level of contribution not seen since the early 1900s.
5 Similarly, legal
immigrants of working age (and with a listed occupation) may have
supplied about 40 percent of the growth in the U.S. labor force in the mid
1990s.
6 Alternatively, Census data suggest that, on a net basis (net of
3 According to the U.S. Census deﬁnition, Hispanics may be of any race.
4 Born between 1946 and 1964.
5 This surge partly reﬂects an amnesty program legalizing the status of undocumented
workers already living in this country, as will be discussed further below.
6 Tracking the ﬂow of immigrants and their impact on the labor force is not straight-
forward. Beyond the legal immigrants, other foreign-born residents, including those who
entered without documents, people with temporary work visas, and students, many of
whom are entitled to work for limited periods as part of their practical training, may also
contribute to the U.S. labor supply. For example, in 1998, the United States admitted 660,000
permanent immigrants, just over half of whom were new arrivals; the rest were simply
adjusting their status. In addition, the INS estimates that 275,000 illegal immigrants entered
the country each year in the mid 1990s. Further, individuals with temporary work visas
134 Jane Sneddon Little and Robert K. Triestgranted under several relatively new or expanded programs numbered over 372,000 in
1998, about 145,000 more than in 1996. (See Wasserman 2001 for a discussion of these
programs.) Foreign students admitted in 1998 equaled 565,000, an increase of 138,000 since
1996. To make keeping track even harder, while the INS counts “arrivals,” students and
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total U.S. population growth in the second half of the 1990s.
7 As a
consequence, the foreign born comprised almost 10 percent of the U.S.
population in the late 1990s, its highest share in 60 years.
8
The steady increase in immigration to the United States over the past
half century reﬂects a series of legal changes in this country along with
shifting economic and social conditions here and abroad. From the mid
1920s to 1965, immigration to the United States was sharply curtailed by
the combination of the Immigration Act of 1924, the Great Depression,
and World War II. The Immigration Act of 1924
9 imposed the country’s
ﬁrst permanent limit on immigration and established the national-origins
quota system that governed U.S. immigration policy for decades. This act
set a (small) annual quota for each nationality on the basis of the stock of
immigrants already living in the United States in 1920. It thus favored
migrants from Northern and Western Europe while sharply reducing the
size of the total inﬂow.
10 By exception, to facilitate farm production
during World War II, 1943 immigration legislation allowed farm workers
from North, South, and Central America to work on U.S. farms on a
temporary basis during the war years. This program became the basis for
the Mexican “Bracero Program,” which lasted through 1964 and ex-
panded the community of Mexican workers with ties to the United States.
In 1965, in the midst of the Vietnam War and another period of relatively
low unemployment, the United States revised its approach to immigra-
tion. It abolished the national-origins quotas from 1924, established an
expanded worldwide quota system that included Asia, and gave prefer-
ence to family uniﬁcation and the admission of people with skills or
training needed in the United States. This legislation opened the way to
a notable shift in the origin of U.S. immigrants from Europe to the
developing world.
For example, in the 1980s, Latin America’s Lost Decade, a series of
ﬁnancial crises caused per capita income to stagnate or fall in much of the
people making intra-company transfers may enter more than once a year. Altogether, the
ﬁgure gives only a hazy picture of the impact of the foreign-born on the U.S. workforce in
the late 1990s.
7 The Census Bureau’s middle series projection assumes foreign-born emigration rates
of 12 percent. Under alternative assumptions, these rates rise as high as 30 percent.
8 That share peaked at nearly 15 percent in 1910.
9 This act followed a series of restrictive laws, including, in particular, the Immigration
Act of 1917 that codiﬁed previous exclusion provisions, barred illiterate aliens, and declared
natives of the “Asia-Paciﬁc triangle” to be “inadmissible.”
10 Easterlin (1968 and 1980) credits the Immigration Act of 1924 with helping to set the
conditions that led to the baby boom. The act largely cut off immigration, with the result that
the very small cohort coming of age in the mid 1940s thrived. As a result, they married early
and had unusually large numbers of children.
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11 During this period, the ﬂow of undocumented workers to the
United States gathered strength. As a consequence, and of some signiﬁ-
cance for recent demographic developments, the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 provided for the legalization of millions of
undocumented aliens who had lived in the United States since 1982. As
these individuals became U.S. citizens in the 1990s, they were in turn able
to sponsor the legal immigration of immediate relatives without numer-
ical limits. Reﬂecting U.S. ambivalence to these developments, other
recent legislation has both limited legal immigrants’ eligibility for gov-
ernment beneﬁts and expanded the numbers of temporary work visas
available each year. In late 2000, for example, the U.S. Congress increased
the number of H-1B non-immigrant visas available annually to 195,000
for FY 2001-2003. In FY 2004 the number reverts to 65,000.
12
As a result of these and other legal, economic, and political forces, by
2000 over half of the U.S. foreign born came from Latin America (with 35
percent from Mexico and Central America and 10 percent from the
Caribbean), as Figure 3 shows. Another 26 percent were born in Asia, and
only 15 percent came from Europe. In 1900, by contrast, 85 percent of the
foreign born came from Europe, with Asia and Latin America contribut-
ing 1 percent each. Even in 1960, 75 percent of the foreign born were
European.
Looking ahead, the Census Bureau’s middle series projection shows
that new (post-2000) immigrants and their offspring will account for
11 In Mexico, to take one important example, the poverty rate rose by almost 14 percent
between 1984 and 1989 as real income per capita fell. While total poverty declined over the
next ﬁve years, poverty rates continued worsening in the agricultural areas in part because
coffee prices plunged with the end of the International Coffee Agreement. Then, following
the peso crisis of 1994-95, total real wages fell sharply again. In manufacturing, real wages
declined 30 percent between early 1995 and mid 1997. Throughout this period, unskilled
workers fared especially poorly. In the decade to 1995, real wages for skilled workers rose
8 percent while real wages for unskilled workers fell 22 percent. Since analysts had expected
increased openness to trade to beneﬁt Mexico’s relatively abundant pool of unskilled
workers, this outcome came as a surprise. The most likely explanation appears to be that
NAFTA speeded the introduction of skill-biased technical change. (See La ¨chler 1998,
Lopez-Acevedo 2000, and Lustig 2001.)
12 Other developments pushing immigrants towards the United States have undoubt-
edly included spillovers from the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95, a series of armed conﬂicts
(in Vietnam, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, and recently, Colombia), and
environmental problems like the dwindling availability of clean water in Mexico. Very
important among the pull factors have been the relatively buoyant economic conditions in
the United States, particularly in the second half of the 1990s, when real average hourly
earnings reversed almost half their long-term decline of 14 percent from their highs in the
1970s. In addition, trade arrangements like Mexico’s maquiladora program and the
Caribbean Basin Initiative, which were intended to spur development overseas, may also
have increased foreign workers’ familiarity with U.S. ﬁrms and encouraged the rapid
expansion of Hispanic communities in all of the states facing Mexico and the Caribbean. The
formation of growing networks of friends and relatives here in this country and the
increased ease of communication and transportation allowing people to keep in touch with
relatives left behind have also facilitated immigration to this country.
THE IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE ON U.S. LABOR MARKETS 137almost two-thirds of the growth in the U.S. population between 1998 and
2100. In addition to the projected impact of increased immigration on U.S.
fertility rates, this projection assumes that net immigration ﬂows will
decline from over 900,000 a year in the late 1990s to 750,000 in 2010 and
then rise again to over 1 million a year in 2030. The near-term decline
reﬂects the diminishing impact of the amnesty program under the IRCA
of 1986, while the resurgence anticipates an increase in the demand for
immigrant labor as the large baby boom cohort leaves the workforce.
13
Although the projected 30 percent increase in the inﬂow of migrants may
seem large, the Census considers it to be a fairly conservative estimate,
given the response of previous migration ﬂows to demographic changes
as large as the projected rise in the U.S. dependency ratio. However, as
the surprise outcome of the Census 2000 suggests, these projections may
well be too low.
Under Census middle series projections, the foreign-born share of
13 After 2030, the Census projects that immigration will proceed at a steady 1.45 million
per year through 2100.
138 Jane Sneddon Little and Robert K. Triestthe population is projected to peak at 13.3 percent of the population
between 2045 and 2055.
14 Largely as a result of this increased immigra-
tion, which Census expects to be dominated by ﬂows from Mexico and
other countries in Central and Latin America, the Hispanic population is
projected to rise from 12 percent of the population currently to 32 percent
(and rising) in 2100. (See Figure 4.)
THE RISING DEPENDENCY RATIO
As suggested above, the Census Bureau’s middle projection results
in a total dependency ratio (the ratio of those under 15 or over 65 to the
working-age population) that exceeds its previous peak in the 1960s,
largely because of a rise in the elderly dependency ratio (the ratio of those
14 Similarly, the foreign born’s share of the working-age population will rise from 12
percent now to 15.3 percent in the mid 2030s. It is projected to fall to today’s level by the end
of the century.
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elderly dependency ratio is likely to double from its current level of 0.2
dependent for every person of working age to just under 0.4 by the end
of this century, as shown in Figure 5. Of more relevance, however, is the
total dependency ratio, which adds the number of children under age 15
to the number of the elderly. Currently, with the leading edge of the baby
boom cohort just approaching retirement, the total dependency ratio
remains relatively low in historical terms—at just above 0.5. However, the
Census Bureau’s new projections suggest that the total dependency ratio
is likely to rise to 0.67 in the early 2030s and to reach 0.72 in 2100. For
most of the century, thus, it will hover near or above the previous high of
0.69 that it touched just brieﬂy in 1961. Moreover, if one assumes with
Cutler et al. (1990) that, with education and medical expenses, children
have just 0.72 the consumption needs of working-age adults while the
elderly have 1.27 times a prime-age adult’s needs, the gap between the
future and previous peaks is substantially greater. By the weighted
measure, the dependency ratio is likely to reach 0.73 in 2100 after
140 Jane Sneddon Little and Robert K. Triestremaining well above its previous high (0.58) and its current level (0.48)
for many years.
As already mentioned, the Census Bureau’s middle series projection
assumes a substantial increase in immigration and anticipates that
immigrants and their offspring will account for almost two-thirds of the
total growth in the U.S. population and over three-fourths of the growth
in the working-age population over this century. Because most new
immigrants are young adults, their arrival tends to lower the dependency
ratio almost immediately. However, these young immigrants also create
an above-average number of dependents, since they tend to be of
childbearing age and have a relatively high fertility rate compared with
the U.S. average. Moreover, by mid century, immigrants arriving today
will themselves be starting to retire. Accordingly, many analysts have
concluded that increased immigration can make only a very limited
contribution to easing any burdens imposed by a high dependency ratio.
For example, Hollman, Mulder, and Kallan (2000) conclude that immi-
gration “may address a high dependency ratio decisively in the short
term, yet is highly inefﬁcient in reducing it over the longer term.”
Using Hollman, Mulder, and Kallan’s data, Figure 6 shows the
dependency ratio assuming zero immigration starting in 2000 as well as
the dependency ratio from the middle series projection, which assumes
substantial immigration. By 2100, the middle series dependency ratio
reaches 0.72—compared with the 0.77 eventuating with zero migration.
Moreover, if we assume once again that children have more modest
consumption needs than the elderly, the dependency ratio hits 0.80 in the
absence of immigration versus 0.73 for the weighted middle series.
Immigration reduces the gap between the weighted dependency ratio at
its previous peak (0.58) and the level projected for 2100 by over 30 percent
(and the gap between the weighted dependency ratio now and the level
projected for 2100 by 20 percent). By these measures, and, in contrast with
Hollman, Mulder, and Kallan’s conclusions, immigration appears to have
a notable impact on the dependency ratio.
15
Because the rise in the dependency ratio reﬂects an increase in
(generally active) life expectancy, it represents an unmitigated gain in
welfare. But to some economists and policymakers, a high dependency
ratio raises concerns about how a small workforce will provide for a
relatively large number of dependents without a decline in the U.S.
standard of living. Indeed, assuming that labor force participation rates
do not change, the projected increase in the dependency ratio implies the
need for a 40 percent gain in labor productivity by the mid 2030s (50
15 In their paper in this volume, Lee and Edwards (2002) also conclude that additional
immigration would have a relatively modest budget impact but would help ease the
long-run ﬁscal situation.
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productivity more than doubled between 1960 and 2000, such a gain
should be well within reach if current trends continue. But, if productiv-
ity growth were to revert to a much slower pace, per capita income could
fall.
Alternatively, most people are not physically dependent at age 65
and are capable of working well past this age. Accordingly, if, at one
extreme, years of lifetime labor force participation rose one-for-one with
added years of life expectancy, the problem of increasing old-age
dependency would be largely resolved (although the transitional issues
associated with the retirement of the baby boomers would remain). In a
sense, then, the old-age dependency “problem” can be seen as a need to
redesign institutions to allow older adults in good health to continue
working, while providing for the consumption needs of those elderly
who ﬁnd continued labor force participation to be difﬁcult.
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Since we now look back at the early 1960s as a golden era for the U.S.
economy, the high dependency ratio of that period clearly did not trigger
seriously adverse developments in U.S. economic welfare. But the post-
war decades also witnessed two trends that, on balance, contributed
signiﬁcantly to the growth in per capita output but are not likely to be
repeated. First, this period saw a surge in women’s labor force participa-
tion rates, which rose—in the case of the young women ages 20 to 24 who
led the way—from 45 percent in 1948 to 73 percent currently. The rise was
particularly rapid in the mid 1960s to late 1970s as the baby boom
generation and their immediate predecessors entered the labor force.
According to Easterlin (1968), the baby boom’s large size damped down
its lifetime earnings prospects, delaying household formation and child-
bearing and encouraging female labor force participation. But clearly,
other developments, like the widespread availability of contraception
and changes in social norms, also played very important roles (Goldin
and Katz 2000). After growing more slowly in the 1980s, women’s labor
force participation stabilized in the 1990s. While prime-age women’s
labor force participation remains below that for men and could conceiv-
ably edge higher, a surge like the one that followed the previous peak in
the dependency ratio is clearly out of the question.
As the men and women of the baby boom generation entered the
workforce, their youth and inexperience reduced the effective size of the
labor force. However, a second major development of the early postwar
era—the increased educational attainment of the population—provided
an important countervailing force. Measured by the median years of
schooling of the population age 25 and above, educational attainment
rose particularly fast during the 1950s and 1960s. As Claudia Goldin
(1998) has documented, secondary school attendance soared in the three
decades before World War II, with enrollment rates rising from 18
percent in 1910 to 73 percent in 1940. Thereafter, the passage of the GI Bill
of Rights in 1944 gave another important spur to increased schooling.
This legislation provided federal support for veterans attending educa-
tional institutions in the postwar years.
16 When Congress enacted similar
beneﬁts after Korea and Vietnam, even higher shares of the veterans from
those conﬂicts used their beneﬁts to attend college.
Naturally, a rise in the average educational attainment of the
workforce increases its effective size.
17 Thus, the educational gains of the
working-age population helped to offset the decline in workforce expe-
16 Out of 15 million World War II veterans, over half used these educational beneﬁts,
and in 1947 veterans accounted for 49 percent of college enrollment.
17 Ho and Jorgenson (1999) conclude that increased educational attainment accounted
for most of the improvement in labor quality between 1948 and 1995. Improvements in labor
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7 provides two measures of labor force “quality”—one calculated by Ho
and Jorgenson (1999) and the other by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). In both cases, the negative impact of the baby boom’s entry into the
workforce is apparent in the ﬂattening of the lines. The renewed rise in
these quality indexes recently reﬂects the maturing of the baby boom
cohort along with ongoing increases in educational attainment.
18 Looking
ahead, however, improvements in average educational attainment can no
longer be taken for granted, for reasons to be discussed below. Thus, two
major developments that supported per capita output growth in the past
half century are unlikely to recur as the dependency ratio reaches new
highs. On the other hand, a sizable increase in the labor force participa-
tion of workers age 65 to 69 is certainly not out of the question, especially
quality, in turn, accounted for a quarter of the growth in labor volume and almost 10 percent
of the growth in U.S. output in the past half century.
18 Examining the reasons for the decline in the unemployment rate and the fall in the
NAIRU since the mid 1980s, Katz and Krueger (1999) ﬁnd the maturing of the baby boom
cohort to be the primary explanation.
144 Jane Sneddon Little and Robert K. Triestgiven the rise in the Social Security retirement age already scheduled to
occur.
19 Such a rise could make a modest dent in the dependency ratio.
20
POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS TO PROJECTED DEMOGRAPHIC
TRENDS
Rapid Productivity Growth
One possible response to projected demographic trends could be a
relatively rapid increase in labor and multifactor productivity (MFP)—as
occurred in the 1960s. As many have already argued, as (if) labor becomes
scarce and costly relative to capital, producers will face incentives to
substitute equipment for workers or to make labor-saving technical or
organizational improvements. In other words, they will try to shift the
labor productivity schedule outward through capital deepening or inno-
vation. Accordingly, economists would expect to ﬁnd a negative relation-
ship between the growth of the labor force or the working-age population
and the growth in labor or multifactor productivity.
21
And indeed, such a negative relationship is now reasonably well
established empirically. For example, in his “Crazy Explanations for the
Productivity Slowdown,” Paul Romer (1987) found that the elasticity of
output with respect to changes in the labor supply was somewhere
between 0.2 and 0.5—a lot less than labor’s share of national income,
perhaps because some forms of innovation are labor saving.
22 The key
implication, Romer pointed out, is that a pickup (decline) in labor force
growth will be associated with a slowdown (rise) in labor productivity
growth. He argued that this link likely explained the U.S. productivity
experience from the late 1960s to 1990.
Following Paul Romer (1987), Cutler et al. (1990) also suggested that
incentives to innovate are strongest when labor is scarce. Using data for
29 relatively high-income countries, they found that a 1-percentage-point
19 In 2003 the full retirement age for Social Security starts to rise gradually until it
reaches 67 in 2027.
20 The labor force participation rates of individuals age 55 to 64 and over 65 have been
rising since 1985 but remain below their previous highs. If one assumes that the Social
Security retirement age rises to 70 and that 25 percent of people age 65 to 69 work (up from
12 percent now, but below this group’s 27-percent participation rate in the late 1940s and
below the 58-percent participation rate for people age 55 to 64 currently), the dependency
ratio at the end of the century would be 0.70. That ratio would not be much above its
previous peak of the early 1960s.
21 A slowing of the growth rate of the labor force will generally also result in an aging
of the labor force. This effect will also tend to increase labor productivity due to an increase
in the average level of labor force experience.
22 These ﬁndings were consistent across several different samples including a lengthy
U.S. time series, a handful of industrial countries over an extended time frame, and, ﬁnally,
115 low- to high-income countries from 1960 to 1981.
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increase in average labor productivity growth of 0.6 percent between 1960
and 1985. They used this evidence that labor scarcity may spur techno-
logical gains to support their optimistic general conclusion that projected
demographic change will provide opportunities as well as challenges.
In a more recent paper, Bernanke and Gu ¨rkaynak (2001) construct
factor shares
23 and estimate long-run total factor productivity (TFP)
growth rates for 50 and 80 countries over a period from 1965 to 1995.
Like Cutler et al., they ﬁnd that TFP growth has a strong negative
relationship with population growth, although the link is weaker when
the savings rate is included. The coefﬁcients on labor growth generally
ranged between 0.4 and 0.7, with the larger coefﬁcients obtained for
the 1980-95 estimates.
By contrast, in his “One Big Wave” paper, Gordon (2000) relies on
related arguments to reach admittedly pessimistic conclusions. After
adjusting multifactor productivity growth for the changing composition
of labor and capital inputs, Gordon ﬁnds that the big wave in produc-
tivity growth was ﬂatter than previously thought, that it peaked between
1950 and 1964, and that the post-1972 slowdown in MFP growth remains
evident. He attributes the great wave to the diffusion of four truly major
pre-World War II innovations—electricity and electric motors, the inter-
nal combustion engine, petroleum-based products, and communication
technology such as radio and television—beside which, he suggests,
computers and other recent inventions pale in comparison. Also impor-
tant in explaining the big wave, he argues, were the closing of the U.S.
labor market to immigration in the 1920s and the goods market to trade
during the Great Depression and war. These developments temporarily
boosted real wages and, thus, capital-labor substitution and productivity
growth. By contrast, the reopening of the U.S. labor and goods markets
starting in the mid 1960s contributed to the post-1972 slowdown in MFP
growth. With the spread of the four big technologies now complete,
Gordon does not expect the “new economy” and ongoing globalization to
lead to a new era of rapid productivity growth.
In general, then, much (but not all) of the evidence in the existing
literature suggests that a slowdown in labor force growth is likely to be
partially offset by a pickup in the growth of labor or multifactor
productivity.
24 For illustrative purposes and to see if this historic rela-
23 The authors adjust the available data on corporate labor income for the downward
bias that results from the importance of the informal sector in many developing countries.
24 Other analysts would argue that this offset should not be taken for granted. For
instance, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001) develop a dynamic, general equilibrium,
life-cycle simulation model and ﬁnd that a dramatic run-up in the payroll tax “dissipates
what would otherwise be a natural process of capital deepening.” This capital “shallowing”
occurs in part because the increase in the payroll taxes required by Social Security and
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showing the relationship between the growth of the working-age U.S.
population and rates of productivity growth from 1904 to 1999. The ﬁrst
three columns in Table 1 show the coefﬁcients from regressions of annual
labor productivity growth rates on a three-year moving average of the
growth rate of the U.S. population ages 25 to 65, the change in the
unemployment rate, and a dummy variable for years affected by the
mobilizations and demobilizations associated with the two world wars.
The relationship between the working-age population growth rate and
the productivity growth rate is consistently negative, large in magnitude,
and statistically signiﬁcant. Adding the change in the unemployment rate
to the speciﬁcation, which controls for cyclical inﬂuences on productivity,
adds greatly to the explanatory power of the regression but has relatively
little effect on the population growth rate coefﬁcient. The world war years
Medicare programs reduces workers’ savings. In addition, KSW model faster technical
progress as equivalent to an increase in the effective size of the labor force (but not in the
effective stock of capital); thus, other things equal, faster technical progress leads to a fall in
the capital-labor ratio. Moreover, because KSW are working with a closed-economy model,
the large increase in the real return on capital that results from this exercise does not attract
capital from abroad.
Table 1
Productivity Growth Rate Regression Results
Dependent Variable











































































Adjusted R-squared .06 .20 .20 .19 .18 .30 .32 .34
Note: Growth rates are approximated by differences in natural logarithms. The moving average is taken over
thethreeyearsendingintheobservationyear;afive-yearmovingaverageyieldsweakerresults,whileusingjust
the contemporaneous value yields results similar to the three-year moving average. The “world war years”
indicator variable is equal to 1 for 1916 to 1918 and 1941 to 1947, and is zero in other years.
THE IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE ON U.S. LABOR MARKETS 147indicator variable has little effect on the other coefﬁcients. The next two
columns show the effect of splitting the sample period at 1950. When this
split is made, the coefﬁcient on the working-age population growth rate
increases in magnitude.
25 A similar pattern occurs in the regressions of
the growth rate of multifactor productivity and the growth rate of the
working-age population shown in the next three columns. The estimated
effect of population growth on multifactor productivity growth is stron-
ger when the sample is split. Overall, the regressions suggest that much
of the effect of demographic trends on labor productivity growth occurs
through the effect of demographics on multifactor productivity.
These regressions are, at best, a reduced-form representation of the
relationship between productivity growth and demographic change that
has existed in the past. Although many other factors enter into the
determination of productivity growth, including both physical and
human capital formation, the simple regression relationship does remark-
25 When the working-age population is deﬁned as that aged 16 to 65 rather than 25 to
65, the coefﬁcient on the working-age population growth rate is positive and statistically
insigniﬁcant in the post-1950 period.
148 Jane Sneddon Little and Robert K. Triestably well in tracking the broad decade-to-decade shifts in productivity
growth rates. Figure 8 compares decade-long averages of actual labor
productivity growth with those predicted by the labor productivity
growth regression based on 1950-99 data. It also shows productivity
growth rates for the twenty-ﬁrst century as predicted by this regression
based on the Census Bureau’s middle series population projections. The
transition from the fast productivity growth of the 1950s and 1960s to the
relatively slow productivity growth of the 1970s and 1980s is surprisingly
well “explained” by the large increase in the growth rate of the working-
age population associated with the maturation of the baby boom gener-
ation. The simple regression also predicts the uptick in productivity
growth in the 1990s.
Looking forward, the regression predicts that the projected slow
growth of the working-age population in the next century will be
accompanied by generally high rates of productivity growth. Although
there are many reasons for being very skeptical of predictions from this
regression, the historical relationship does provide some grounds for
optimism about productivity growth in coming decades. However, one
important factor not controlled for in these regressions is the past trend of
increasing educational attainment. As we discuss below, there is reason
to be concerned about future trends in educational attainment.
Increased Immigration and Its Impact on Educational Attainment
Although increased immigration is one of the major demographic
trends factored into the Census Bureau’s projections and has, thus,
already been discussed in detail above, this likely development is itself a
response to labor shortages stemming from the aging of the U.S.
population combined with current and expected U.S. fertility rates. While
a relative rise in the U.S. demand for labor may lead to increases in the
female or elderly participation rate, these increases are likely to be fairly
small, as already noted. In addition, a sustained increase in the U.S.
fertility rate, while possible, seems highly unlikely. Thus, immigrants
may represent the most elastic available source of labor—as the recent
inﬂux of foreign workers in response to the low U.S. unemployment rates
and tight labor market conditions of the 1990s seems to illustrate.
While immigration is projected to make a large contribution to the
growth in the U.S. working-age population, the impact of the increased
size of the labor force on national output may be attenuated by the large
gap between the average educational attainment of the foreign- and the
native-born populations. The next section explores this gap and its
possible consequences in some detail.
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Immigration will not only change the size of the U.S. population and
labor force but also has the potential to affect the level of U.S. educational
attainment. Relative to the U.S.-born population, a much higher percent-
age of immigrants have not completed high school (as shown in Table 2),
although it is also true that a higher percentage of immigrants than
native-born Americans have earned graduate degrees.
26 This bimodal
pattern, with large shares of the immigrant population having either very
high or very low levels of educational attainment at the time of the
survey, mainly reﬂects big differences in the educational attainment of
immigrants by country of origin. Nearly 68 percent of Mexican migrants
ages 25 to 64 have not completed high school, compared to roughly 11
percent of U.S.-born residents in the same age range. In the case of the
foreign born from other Western Hemisphere countries, roughly 34
percent have less than a high school education. In contrast, the percentage
of immigrants from other parts of the world who have not completed
high school is close to the share for U.S.-born residents.
At the high end of the spectrum of educational attainment, roughly
26 percent of native-born Americans have completed a four-year college
degree, compared to less than 5 percent of Mexican immigrants and
approximately 16 percent of immigrants from other Latin American
26 The data for this section are from merged samples of the March Current Population
Survey (CPS) from 1994 through 2000. Only households in their ﬁrst four months of
inclusion in the survey were included in the merged sample. The data relate to all
foreign-born U.S. residents, whether or not they are permanent legal immigrants. By
contrast, Jasso, Rosenzweig, and Smith (1998) use INS data to examine the skills of new legal
immigrants and ﬁnd that since the mid 1980s the gap between the educational attainment
of these legal immigrants and the U.S. population has been narrowing.
Table 2



















Less than High School 11.1 67.6 34.4 13.3 12.4 6.2 15.7
High School Graduate 35.4 18.3 29.3 22.0 29.1 19.8 27.6
Some College 27.5 9.4 20.2 18.5 23.4 19.7 21.6
Bachelor’s Degree 17.6 3.5 11.0 29.7 21.1 32.6 21.8
Graduate School 8.4 1.1 5.2 16.6 14.1 21.6 13.3
Source: U.S. residents aged 25–64 as computed by the authors from merged March Current Population
Survey files, 1994–2000.
150 Jane Sneddon Little and Robert K. Triestcountries. But immigrants from other parts of the world are more likely
to have completed a four-year college degree than are native-born
Americans. Similarly, immigrants from outside Latin America are sub-
stantially more likely to hold graduate degrees than are native-born
Americans.
Examining the educational attainment of immigrants and native-
born Americans by age cohort, shown in Table 3, indicates that the
educational attainment of all groups has increased over time.
27 Within
age cohorts, Mexican immigrants have by far the lowest levels of
educational attainment, followed by immigrants from other Latin Amer-
ican countries. The tendency for immigrants from outside Latin America
to be better educated than native-born Americans is more pronounced for
younger than for older cohorts.
Underlying the differences in educational attainment by country of
origin are several factors. Migrants from Mexico can travel to the United
States at lower cost than immigrants from most other countries, and
strong family and social networks link the two countries, in part because
Mexicans have worked in U.S. agriculture for decades. Moreover, the
long border between the U.S. and Mexico makes illegal immigration from
Mexico easier than from other countries. These factors would tend to
facilitate immigration of relatively unskilled workers. By contrast, outside
Mexico (and especially outside Latin America), legal restrictions, high
travel costs, and lack of information networks impede the immigration of
those with relatively low levels of education. Highly educated workers, in
contrast, tend to be more favored under immigration law, are more likely
to possess the ﬁnancial resources to pay travel expenses, and may have
information about job opportunities through university or corporate
contacts. This pattern is somewhat similar to that for intranational
migration: Highly educated workers effectively face a national labor
market, less educated workers a local one.
Figure 9 shows the region of origin of foreign-born U.S. residents (as
of 1994-2000) by decade of arrival. Over time, the shares of new
immigrants from Mexico and Asia have increased, while the share of
immigrants from Europe has declined. Because immigrants from Europe
and Asia tend to attain high levels of education, while Mexican migrants
do not, this shift in country of origin has depressed the average
educational attainment of recent immigrants.
What does this imply for the educational attainment of the future
U.S. labor force? The answer largely depends on several factors, including
27 One should take account of the degree-completion effect in interpreting this ﬁgure.
As individuals age, they are able to complete higher levels of education. The trend of
younger cohorts to have higher levels of eventually completed educational attainment will
tend to be masked by this effect, especially for completion of advanced degrees by relatively
young cohorts.
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Educational Attainment, by Origin and Age Group
Percent


















20–24 Less than High School 11 62 31 10 9 7
High School 33 23 32 19 31 17
Some College 44 14 32 52 45 59
Bachelor’s Degree 11 1 5 17 13 15
Graduate School 1 0 0 3 2 3
25–29 Less than High School 9 61 32 9 8 0
High School 33 24 31 19 25 31
Some College 31 11 24 26 27 32
Bachelor’s Degree 22 3 11 33 27 26
Graduate School 5 0 3 14 13 11
30–34 Less than High School 9 64 30 9 7 10
High School 35 21 31 22 26 18
Some College 29 10 23 20 24 19
Bachelor’s Degree 20 4 12 29 27 27
Graduate School 7 1 4 20 15 25
35–44 Less than High School 9 68 31 12 9 6
High School 36 17 28 22 29 15
Some College 29 9 22 19 24 21
Bachelor’s Degree 18 4 12 29 23 38
Graduate School 8 1 6 18 16 19
45–54 Less than High School 11 74 36 15 13 4
High School 34 13 29 23 30 24
Some College 27 8 18 15 24 10
Bachelor’s Degree 17 3 10 31 19 31
Graduate School 11 2 6 16 15 31
55–64 Less than High School 19 80 47 23 23 13
High School 39 10 28 26 33 16
Some College 21 6 12 13 19 22
Bachelor’s Degree 12 2 7 25 15 31
Graduate School 9 1 6 14 11 18
65 and
older Less than High School 33 85 56 44 36 17
High School 36 8 25 23 32 29
Some College 17 4 9 12 15 28
Bachelor’s Degree 9 2 6 13 10 27
Graduate School 5 1 5 8 6 0
Source: Authors’ computations from March Current Population files, 1994-2000.
152 Jane Sneddon Little and Robert K. Triestwhere future immigrants originate, trends in educational attainment in
countries of origin, and the speed at which the educational attainment of
immigrants’ descendants converges to that of the native-born population.
Regarding the ﬁrst factor, the U.S. Census Bureau projects that immigra-
tion from Mexico and Central America will decline in importance relative
to immigration from South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East
(Hollmann, Mulder, and Kallan 2000). The Census Bureau notes that
much of the recent legal immigration from Mexico and Central America
reﬂects the arrival of the immediate relatives of migrants who became
legalized under the IRCA in the late 1980s (as discussed above), and
predicts that immigration linked to this amnesty program will gradually
decline to zero. Instead, the Census Bureau expects that future immi-
grants will increasingly come from areas with rapid population growth
and consequent economic pressures. Because countries in South Asia,
sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East currently have fertility rates well
above those of Mexico and most other Latin American countries, the
Census Bureau expects that these regions will become increasingly
important sources of immigration to this country.
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levels of educational attainment in recent decades, this shift in the mix of
countries of origin might tend to boost the overall educational attainment
of future immigrants. However, average levels of educational attainment
may slip as the volume of immigration from these areas increases.
Moreover, the degree to which the source-country mix will change is
quite uncertain. Europe, which is closer to the high population growth
areas than is the United States, may be a more likely destination for
immigrants from Africa and South Asia. Europe is widely forecast to
experience population declines over the next half century and will
generally experience more rapid population aging than will the United
States; thus, that continent’s sharply higher wages are expected to be a
draw for immigrants.
One encouraging sign for the future U.S. workforce is a pronounced
trend toward higher educational attainment among recent cohorts of
Mexican immigrants. Comparing high school completion rates across age
cohorts suggests that the percentage of Mexican immigrants who failed to
complete high school is dropping at a rate of roughly 0.6 percentage point
per year. Although these impressive gains indicate that future immi-
grants from Mexico will carry substantially higher levels of human
capital than have previous cohorts, a large disparity between the educa-
tional attainment of Mexican immigrants and native-born Americans will
likely continue well into the future.
Many immigrants arrive in the United States at an age when their
U.S.-born counterparts are still in school. For example, roughly one-
quarter of the Mexican immigrants ages 20 to 45 (when sampled between
1994 and 2000) settled permanently in the United States when they were
less than 15 years old. Immigrants arriving as children can potentially
take advantage of the U.S. educational system, but their ability to do so
may be impeded by lack of English language skills and gaps in their
education prior to immigrating. Children who come at a very young age
are likely to have a relatively easy time learning English and are able to
enter the U.S. school system at an early level. We would expect these
children to complete higher levels of schooling on average than immi-
grants who arrive at an older age. The data support this expectation: Only
30 percent of the Mexican immigrants who settled permanently in this
country by age 8 failed to complete high school, compared to 60 percent
who arrived at ages 8 to 14, and 70 percent who were 15 or older when
they arrived.
28 A somewhat similar pattern is found for immigrants from
other Latin American countries, but generally not for immigrants from
Asia or Europe.
28 These estimates are based on the authors’ calculations from the March CPS pooled
from 1994 through 2000.
154 Jane Sneddon Little and Robert K. TriestAlthough our focus in this section has been on immigrants, U.S.-born
Hispanics (that is, the second- and third-plus-generation Hispanics) and
blacks also suffer from levels of educational attainment that on average
are signiﬁcantly lower than that of non-Hispanic whites. Table 4 shows
Table 4
Educational Attainment, by Ethnicity and Age Group
Percent

















20–24 Less than High School 21 22 9 6 18 22 7
High School 40 32 32 26 38 41 26
Some College 36 42 46 50 39 34 46
Bachelor’s Degree 4 4 12 17 5 3 20
Graduate School 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
25–34 Less than High School 20 19 8 5 14 20 6
High School 38 31 34 25 41 37 25
Some College 30 34 29 32 31 36 30
Bachelor’s Degree 10 12 23 28 11 7 31
Graduate School 2 4 6 11 2 1 8
35–44 Less than High School 19 22 7 5 15 18 3
High School 39 34 36 27 40 37 24
Some College 29 30 29 30 30 32 30
Bachelor’s Degree 9 10 19 24 12 9 28
Graduate School 4 4 9 15 4 3 15
45–54 Less than High School 28 27 9 5 22 21 3
High School 33 31 34 30 38 36 20
Some College 26 28 27 27 24 29 34
Bachelor’s Degree 8 9 18 21 11 10 31
Graduate School 5 5 12 16 6 5 13
55–64 Less than High School 45 47 17 11 38 37 11
High School 30 28 40 38 33 31 33
Some College 15 17 22 23 18 21 31
Bachelor’s Degree 6 6 12 16 7 7 17
Graduate School 4 2 9 13 5 4 8
65 or
older Less than High School 66 68 30 30 59 51 22
High School 21 20 37 39 24 26 47
Some College 10 9 19 17 19 14 21
Bachelor’s Degree 3 2 10 9 4 4 6
Graduate School 1 2 5 6 3 4 3
Note: White, black, American Indian, and Asian ethnicity groups exclude those who identify themselves as
Hispanic.
Source: Authors’ computations from merged March Current Population Survey files, 1994-2000.
THE IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE ON U.S. LABOR MARKETS 155patterns of educational attainment for U.S.-born citizens by age group. As
with immigrants, younger cohorts are signiﬁcantly better educated than
older cohorts. However, this pattern of improvement has largely stopped
in recent decades. There is relatively little difference between the educa-
tional attainment of 35- to 44-year-olds compared to the 25- to 34-year-old
group (although the 25- to 34-year-olds will have acquired additional
schooling by the time they are 35 to 44). At all age levels, Hispanics,
blacks, and American Indians have lower average levels of educational
attainment than do non-Hispanic whites and those of Asian or Paciﬁc
Islander ancestry. The data shown for Hispanics and for non-Hispanic
whites are split into separate groups, for those whose parents were born
in the United States and those who have at least one parent who was born
outside the United States.
29 Among non-Hispanic whites, having at least
one parent who was an immigrant is associated with higher average
levels of educational attainment for all but the oldest age group. Among
Hispanics, the youngest cohorts show a similar tendency.
Although the U.S.-born children of Hispanic immigrants (the second
generation) attain as much education as the children of U.S.-native
Hispanics (the third generation), their educational attainment falls well
short of the overall U.S. average for all age groups. Thus, the increasing
share of Hispanics in the working-age population may exert a downward
pull on average levels of educational attainment of the U.S. labor force
unless substantial progress is made in addressing the educational needs
of Hispanic youngsters.
Trade as an Alternative to Immigration
A third possible adjustment to slow labor force growth and rising
wages in this country might be increased import activity, for, as econo-
mists discussing immigration often point out, immigration and imports
are alternative ways of tapping foreign labor supplies. Both are efﬁcient in
that they improve the allocation of resources and raise global productiv-
ity. And both tend to reduce the return to competing domestic resources,
unskilled labor in particular.
Analysts describing the impact of immigration on destination-coun-
try wages sometimes point out that buying imports and hiring immi-
grants are alternative ways of purchasing the labor of non-native work-
ers. These discussions tend to focus on the impact of immigration on the
relative supply of labor; they pay considerably less attention to the impact
of immigration on the level or composition of labor demand. They
usually explain that both immigration and trade effectively increase the
29 Other groups were not similarly split because of concerns about relatively low
sample sizes.
156 Jane Sneddon Little and Robert K. Triestsupply of labor, particularly low-skilled labor, in this country and should
thus be expected to reduce the wages of native (unskilled) workers.
30
But many of these studies ignore the likelihood that by adding to the
number of consumers living in this country, immigration raises the
demand for U.S. labor and, possibly, alters the composition of demand as
well. Almost surely, immigration raises the demand for labor by more
than would the marginal increase in U.S. exports occurring if the United
States were to import from the origin countries a quantity of goods equal
to that produced by the new immigrants. Despite some similarities,
accordingly, immigration and trade are not equivalent in this respect.
As a practical matter, moreover, many services—particularly per-
sonal care and household services—are not tradable. However, immigra-
tion can reduce the cost of providing non-tradable services. Non-tradable
service industries that employ relatively large numbers of low-skilled,
low-paid immigrants include health care, housekeeping and food ser-
vices, domestic tourism, construction, landscaping, and agriculture. Ac-
cording to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, the over-65s and, even
more, the over-75s spend disproportionately large shares of their income
on many of these services. Thus, the demand for workers to staff these
industries is likely to rise as the population ages.
It is unclear to what extent either increased trade or increased
immigration can help provide for the consumption needs of the aging
U.S. population. Filling the gap between U.S. consumption and output
with net imports requires that foreigners be willing to ﬁnance the U.S.
trade deﬁcit. While the United States has often been able to run a trade
deﬁcit for extended periods, eventually those deﬁcits must be repaid. In
the meantime, the United States remains vulnerable to abrupt corrections.
By contrast, increased immigration allows the United States to satisfy
increased domestic consumption with domestic output, avoiding the
need to repay foreign investors at a future date and the danger of
disruptive reversals. But immigrant workers must also be paid, and they
have their own consumption needs. Increased immigration would im-
prove the ﬁnances of pay-as-you-go social insurance programs and
would attenuate cost increases associated with domestic labor shortages,
but it should certainly not be viewed as a magical way of meeting the
consumption needs of the aged.
The gap between immigrants’ earnings in the United States and in
their native country suggests that it may sometimes be more efﬁcient for
30 This assumption is common whether the study uses factor proportions analysis (as in
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1996) or cross-area analysis (as in Card and DiNardo 2000).
Indeed, after Card and DiNardo conclude that ﬂight by natives from areas attracting large
immigrant communities does not explain why immigration seems to have very small effects
on the local labor market outcomes of the native born, they suggest that endogenous shifts
in industrial structure may be responsible.
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trade. This differential reﬂects the gap between their productivity in the
United States and abroad, which, in turn, reﬂects U.S.-foreign differences
in capital-labor ratios, accumulated human capital, institutional arrange-
ments, and so forth.
31 As Lucas (1990) and Bernanke and Gu ¨rkaynak
(2001) have pointed out, investments in physical and human capital
appear to create important externalities. For example, physical invest-
ment allows private knowledge to become publicly available. Similarly,
investment in schooling provides externalities because highly educated
individuals tend to be more productive working with other well-
educated people than alone.
32 By reducing the return to investment in the
capital-poor countries and raising it in the capital-rich ones, these
externalities may help to explain why people and capital often both ﬂow
to the industrialized countries.
33
All in all, then, despite their similarities, trade and immigration are
likely to have considerably different impacts on U.S. labor markets, the
U.S. trade balance, and global productivity. They are not equivalent.
Wage Structure and Inequality
Demographic shifts will likely also affect labor markets in additional,
somewhat subtle, ways. For example, changes in the relative supplies of
different types of labor are likely to affect the structure of wages. As the
supply of young workers shrinks relative to that of older workers, the
wage premium attached to labor market experience is likely to decrease,
a phenomenon that may have started to take place in the late 1990s.
In contrast, demographic trends may exert upward pressure on the
educational wage premium. A commonly advanced explanation for the
increase in the economic return to higher education in the late twentieth
century, at the same time that the relative supply of college graduates was
growing, is as follows: Skill-biased technical change increased demand
for highly educated workers to such a degree that their relative earnings
31 Differences in capital-labor ratios are probably most relevant for unskilled workers,
while interacting with peers is probably most relevant for the highly skilled. Indeed, the
spur to creativity from interactions between domestic and foreign-trained professionals may
be among the primary beneﬁts of migration.
32 Purchases of telecommunications equipment exhibit comparable network or agglom-
eration spillovers.
33 From the source countries’ perspective, immigrants’ remittances from their host-
country earnings are making signiﬁcant contributions to the source country’s resources.
According to a study by the Inter-American Development Bank’s Multilateral Investment
Fund, remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean exceeded aid ﬂows and equaled
almost one-third of foreign direct investment ﬂows to that region in 2000. In Mexico,
remittances were equivalent to tourism earnings and two-thirds of the country’s oil
revenues. In Haiti remittances amounted to 17 percent of GDP. (See Fidler 2001.)
158 Jane Sneddon Little and Robert K. Triestrose even in the face of increased supply. Given that future gains in
average levels of educational attainment are quite uncertain, continued
skill-biased technical change could exert a powerful upward push on the
economic return to education.
In a recent paper, Card and Lemieux (2000) examine the interaction
of age and education effects in the determinants of the wage structure.
They note that the increase in the college wage premium has occurred for
younger, but not older, men, and they advance the hypothesis that this is
due to a slowdown in the growth of educational attainment. Because of
imperfect substitutability between older and younger workers, the in-
crease in the education premium has been concentrated in the younger
cohorts, who have experienced the slowdown in the growth of educa-
tional attainment. Over time, as older cohorts are replaced by younger
ones, the increase in the education wage premium will extend over more
workers. Intriguingly, Card and Lemieux note that the slowdown in
educational attainment seemed to coincide with the baby boom genera-
tion reaching college age. This fact, which is presumably due to a
crowding effect, suggests that future growth in educational attainment
may vary with the size of the college-age cohort.
Overall, demographic trends seem to be working toward further
increases in earnings inequality. The increase in the percentage of
workers who are immigrants, who tend to be more concentrated in the
tails of the distribution of educational attainment than native-born
Americans, will likely lead toward increased inequality. The increase in
the percentage of future school-age youths who are Hispanic will also
tend to exacerbate inequality unless the educational attainment of His-
panic youths rises to the national average. Possible further increases in
the economic return to education would also contribute to increased
inequality (while increasing the incentive to invest in educational attain-
ment). The possible decrease in the return to labor market experience, in
contrast, would tend to reduce inequality. However, this decrease in
inequality would result in a larger share of the remaining inequality
stemming from differences in lifetime earnings rather than from differ-
ences in earnings over the stages of the life cycle.
Unemployment and the NAIRU
Younger workers tend to have more volatile labor market experi-
ences than do older workers. The young tend to move in and out of the
labor force at higher rates, often because they are moving in or out of
school. They also tend to switch jobs more frequently, as they search for
opportunities that match their evolving skills. And when employed, they
are at higher risk of being laid off because of their low levels of seniority.
As a result of these factors, younger workers tend to have signiﬁcantly
higher unemployment rates than older workers.
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increased with the entry of the baby boomers into the labor force, and
then decreased as they matured. Bleakley and Fuhrer (1997) estimate that
the aging of the baby boom generation resulted in a decrease in
unemployment rates of 0.75 percentage points between 1979 and 1995.
Similarly, Katz and Krueger (1999) estimate that age-structure effects
increased unemployment rates by 0.71 percentage points between 1960
and 1979, and then decreased unemployment rates by 0.73 percentage
points in subsequent years.
As the labor force ages further in the years ahead, this trend can be
expected to result in additional downward pressure on unemployment
rates and the NAIRU. However, Katz and Krueger suggest that future
demographically driven reductions will be modest, with a further decline
of just 0.05 percentage point in unemployment rates by 2006.
Summary
This section has reviewed ways in which the U.S. economy may
adjust to the demographic changes that produce a rising dependency
ratio. Labor or multifactor productivity may increase, and U.S. employers
may tap foreign labor supplies in two different ways—by hiring more
immigrants and by importing more goods and services. Theory and
empirical evidence suggest that periods of slow labor force growth
should be (and historically have been) associated with capital deepening
and increased labor and multifactor productivity. However, in recent
years, tight U.S. labor markets have also triggered sizable ﬂows of foreign
workers with relatively low levels of educational attainment, ﬂows that
the Census Bureau projects will continue well into the future. These large
inﬂows of foreign workers will ease U.S. labor shortages but may curb
future aggregate productivity gains in this country by slowing improve-
ments in the average educational attainment of the U.S. workforce.
Projections of future levels of educational attainment in major source
countries like Mexico, where recent improvements have been substantial,
suggest that closing the gap with the United States will nevertheless take
a long time. In this country, moreover, data on the educational attainment
of second- and third-generation Hispanic children provide cause for
concern. Finally, while trade provides another channel for employing
foreign workers, trade and immigration are likely to have somewhat
different effects on the wages of similar U.S. workers. Moreover, earnings
differentials reﬂecting effects of accumulated investments in human and
physical capital in the United States suggest that immigration may at
times be more effective than trade in raising global productivity.
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This paper has suggested that projected demographic changes are
likely to increase the U.S. dependency ratio—on a long-term basis—to a
level well above the previous peak touched brieﬂy in 1961. The increase
occurs despite the substantial immigration and a consequent increase in
fertility that keep the dependency ratio from rising even higher than in
the Census Bureau’s middle series projection. Because the increase in the
dependency ratio primarily reﬂects longer (and generally healthier) life
expectancies, it is much to be welcomed. However, it also raises questions
in some observers’ minds about the ease with which a relatively small
workforce will supply the consumption needs of a relatively large
number of dependents.
This paper also suggests, however, that we can be reasonably
conﬁdent that the U.S. economy will accommodate the real demands
posed by these demographic changes without serious strain—although
certain groups may bear a disproportionate share of the adjustment
costs.
34 Judging from history, the wage pressures resulting from the
relatively slow growth of the labor force are likely to encourage addi-
tional capital deepening and an acceleration in labor and multifactor
productivity growth. Increased productivity will, in turn, help the
relatively small labor supply to support a larger number of depen-
dents—if historic relationships continue.
But a second part of the adjustment—already factored into the
Census Bureau’s projections—entails a growing role for immigrants and
their descendants. While this projected increase lowers the dependency
ratio to a noticeable degree (compared with the alternative of no
immigration), some observers are concerned that an increased reliance on
immigration could slow this country’s productivity gains—largely be-
cause many of these new Americans arrive with very little schooling.
While immigrants from countries outside Latin America are on average
slightly better educated than U.S. citizens, and while the average educa-
tional attainment of immigrants has risen over time, the increased
importance of unskilled migrants from Mexico and the Caribbean is
creating a growing gap between U.S.- and foreign-born average educa-
tional attainment. This gap is likely to persist well into the future despite
expected gains in schooling in the source countries. Moreover, and well
within the reach of U.S. domestic responsibilities, the second- and
third-plus generations of native-born Hispanics continue to exhibit
educational attainment well below the U.S. average.
The relative increase in the supply of unskilled workers is likely to
34 The difﬁculties in ﬁnancing the needs of an increasingly elderly population are the
focus of another paper in this volume.
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born workers with little schooling. In contrast to the past century, which
brought big gains in U.S. schooling that were important in boosting U.S.
productivity growth, the current century could see average U.S. educa-
tional attainment stagnate or even decline. Given the importance of
productivity gains to maintaining or increasing our standard of living as
the population ages and the relative size of our workforce shrinks, raising
U.S. educational attainment heads the set of policy implications listed
below.
U.S. Educational Attainment
The data collected for this paper suggest that ﬁnding ways to address
the educational needs of our Hispanic youth should be a high priority.
The fact that young Hispanic adults exhibit lower educational attainment
than their black and white non-Hispanic counterparts suggests that a lack
of English language skills may be an important deterrent to educational
and occupational success, as corroborated in a recent paper by Bleakley
and Chin (2001). Because Bleakley and Chin’s results show that better
English language skills induce greater educational attainment, the au-
thors suggest that early intervention is likely to be most beneﬁcial. Other
new research by Reynolds et al. (2001) followed children who had
participated in the Chicago Child-Parent Centers, a highly structured
pre-school program, for 15 years. They found that by age 20 the program
participants had considerably higher rates of high school completion than
the control group.
35 Again, the results suggest that early childhood
education can be a good investment.
Residential Isolation
If the need to encourage the educational attainment of second- and
third-generation Hispanic children and other ethnic/racial groups who
tend to leave school early is obvious, the solutions are clearly not easy.
Remedies remain difﬁcult, in part because immigrants from Central
America and native Hispanics tend to cluster in a few impoverished
inner-city neighborhoods.
36 Indeed, according to the Census 2000 data,
over half of all Hispanics live in two states, California and Texas, while
35 The French may also provide useful models, for in France, all children start preschool
at age 3, and the government pours extra resources into schools in poor (immigrant)
neighborhoods (Stanley 2001).
36 In 2000, 24 percent of the foreign born from Central America and 21 percent from the
Caribbean were impoverished versus 11 percent for U.S. natives and 17 percent for all
foreign born. Poverty rates for immigrants from other areas ranged from below to just
slightly above the level for U.S. natives.
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Dade, FL; Harris County, TX (Houston); and Cook County, IL (Chicago).
Indeed, Logan et al. (2001) conclude that that Hispanics live more isolated
lives now than they did in 1990.
37 This residential segregation undoubt-
edly deters the attainment of English language skills and helps to
maintain expectations that discourage advanced schooling, especially for
women.
38 Although ethnic communities clearly provide important sup-
port networks, it seems worth considering whether experiments like the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Moving to
Opportunity program, which combines subsidies for private housing
with signiﬁcant counseling, could be beneﬁcial. (See Katz, Kling, and
Liebman 2001 and Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschﬁeld 2001 on the MTO
experiment.)
Federal Funding for Communities Affected by Immigration
While the forces propelling immigration are national and interna-
tional, education is largely a local responsibility. Because the Hispanic
population is highly concentrated, the cost of educating the second and
third generations falls largely to a relatively few cities where resources for
coping may be scarce. For example, Hispanics accounted for 46 percent of
the population of Los Angeles, CA, 59 percent of the population in San
Antonio, TX, and over 90 percent of the population in Laredo, TX,
Brownsville, TX, and Hialeah, FL. This concentration suggests the need
for federal support for educating these children. Since the costs of
immigration are likely to fall heavily on U.S. youth with little schooling
while its beneﬁts will largely accrue to highly skilled and older U.S.
natives,
39 federal funds to encourage increased schooling more generally
in low-income areas (where students tend to drop out early) may also be
worth considering.
Social Insurance Policy
The aging of the U.S. population implies that an increasing share of
future federal government spending will be devoted to the major social
insurance programs serving the older population: Social Security, Medi-
care, and Medicaid. In order to free up resources for the interventions
37 For example, the average Hispanic now lives in a neighborhood that is 46 percent
Hispanic, compared with 43 percent in 1990. By comparison, the average white lives in a
neighborhood that is 80 percent white, down from 85 percent in 1990.
38 In related research, Gaviria and Raphael (2001) ﬁnd that school-based peer effects are
important in explaining the likelihood of dropping out.
39 Who will be able to purchase personal and other services supplied by these
low-skilled workers at lower cost. Such services will also allow the high-skilled to spend
more time in more productive activities. In addition, of course, the migrants are themselves
major beneﬁciaries of immigration.
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dependency, social insurance reforms that encourage increased self-
reliance on the part of the ”young“ elderly seem worth exploring.
One possible reform would be to raise the age at which workers
become eligible for full Social Security pensions to 70 and, perhaps, to
index the normal retirement age to future increases in life expectancy.
However, it is essential to recognize that the elderly are a very heteroge-
neous group. First, the health status of the elderly varies widely, with
those with low lifetime earnings generally at higher risk for disability at
relatively young ages. And then, as Smith (1997) points out, the U.S.
elderly also exhibit great disparities in income and wealth. Policy reforms
will need to protect those who ﬁnd continued work difﬁcult and those
who are in ﬁnancial need. Protecting the disability insurance component
of Social Security and, perhaps, making the Primary Insurance Amount
formula more progressive as the normal retirement age increases, are two
ways of achieving this outcome.
Social Security has been very successful in reducing poverty among
older Americans: The poverty rate for the U.S. elderly has now fallen to
less than 10 percent. However, the poverty rate for children under 18 has
risen to 22 percent from 14 percent in 1969. Focusing social insurance
more directly on the goal of preventing poverty among the elderly, while
using the resources freed up to address the needs of younger residents,
warrants consideration.
Immigration Policy
As discussed in the body of the paper, relatively unfettered move-
ments of goods, services, people, and the ideas they carry with them are
likely to promote an efﬁcient allocation of resources and productivity
gains. But while trade and investment both allow U.S. residents to buy
labor services from non-native workers, they may have different effects
on U.S. wages, trade balances, and productivity developments. In partic-
ular, the gap between real earnings in the United States and in migrants’
home countries and the lack of generalized cross-country convergence in
productivity levels suggest that immigration is likely to be both inevitable
and, often, relatively efﬁcient as a means of raising global productivity
and U.S. standards of living.
40
Redesigning our immigration policies to limit entry to the most
highly skilled, as is widely under discussion (Wasserman 2001), is not
40 In an era when many industrial and some developing countries are likely to have a
rising dependency ratio and a domestic labor force that is nearly stagnant or shrinking,
prospects for global productivity may become a matter of domestic policy concern in many
countries.
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walk across the border) or in our economic best interests. Surely,
however, given U.S. traditions and ethical concerns, immigration policy
must be determined by considerations beyond the purely economic.
Outside California, Texas, and Florida, much of the U.S. public
appears unaware of, or surprised by, the fact that the United States is
once again a nation of recent immigrants. But this outcome should not
have taken us by surprise, since shifts in labor market conditions and
trends in fertility and immigration are all closely intertwined. After all,
with hindsight, we see that the U.S. policy decision to close the door to
immigrants in the 1920s helped to trigger the baby boom–baby bust
phenomenon. The recent and projected pickup in the ﬂow of immigrants
is a natural response to the entry of the baby bust generation into the
labor force and to the retirement of the baby boom cohort that lies ahead.
If the low average educational attainment of a fraction of these migrants
and their offspring is a cause for concern, the responsibility for choosing
policy actions that will help turn a potential problem into a major asset
lies with us.
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